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DO INVESTORS IN CONTROLLED FIRMS
VALUE INSIDER TRADING LAWS?
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE
Laura Nyantung Beny"
ABSTRACT
This article characterizes insider trading as an agency problem in firms
that have a controlling shareholder. Using a standard agency model of cor-
porate value diversion through insider trading by the controlling share-
holder, I derive testable hypotheses about the relationship between corpo-
rate value and insider trading laws among such firms. The article tests
these hypotheses using firm-level cross-sectional data from twenty-seven
developed countries. The results show that stringent insider trading laws
and enforcement are associated with greater corporate valuation among the
sample firms in common law countries, a result that is consistent with the
claim that insider trading laws mitigate agency costs. In contrast, I find that
insider trading laws and enforcement are generally insignificant to corpo-
rate value among the sample firms in civil law countries. I find no support,
however, for the claim that insider trading laws exacerbate agency costs and
thus no support for the deregulatory position. These results are robust to
controlling for a variety of potentially relevant factors and suggest that the
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firm-level impact of insider trading regulation may depend on the local
context in which it is applied (or not applied, as the case may be).
I. INTRODUCTION
Insider trading has long been debated in law and economics literature.'
The central question is whether insider trading is efficiency-improving or
efficiency-reducing for firms and the stock market as a whole. At the mar-
ket level, the debate concerns the effect of insider trading on characteristics
of the stock market such as stock market liquidity and volatility and stock
price efficiency or accuracy. The relevant question here is whether insider
trading enhances or reduces stock market efficiency.2 At the firm level, the
debate focuses on the impact of insider trading on the intra-firm agency
conflict, the classic conflict of interest between managers or controlling
shareholders (the agents) and non-controlling shareholders (the principals).3
The salient question at the firm level is whether insider trading ameliorates
or worsens this conflict. This article focuses on the impact of insider trad-
ing on the agency conflict within the firm.
The impact of insider trading on the intra-firm agency conflict is an
important issue because it raises the weighty corollary question of who
ought to monitor and regulate insider trading: the government, via a blanket
prohibition of insider trading, versus firms and shareholders, via private
contracting. There are three major views on the impact of insider trading
on the agency conflict. The first position is that insider trading mitigates
this conflict and therefore insider trading regulation reduces intra-firm effi-
ciency (Carlton and Fischel 1983). In contrast, the second position holds
that insider trading exacerbates the agency conflict and consequently in-
sider trading regulation promotes intra-firm efficiency (e.g., Cox 1986;
Manove 1989; Kraakman 1991; Klock 1994; and Maug 2002).
The third position straddles the fence, maintaining that the effect of in-
sider trading on the agency conflict is indeterminate and varies across firms.
Nevertheless, according to proponents of the third view, private contracting
is superior to insider trading regulation because private parties are more
capable than the government of assessing the effect of insider trading on the
corporation (see, e.g., Haddock and Macey 1987; Epstein 2004).' Private
contracting will promote varied and efficient responses to insider trading
1 For a summary of the debate, see Beny (2007) and Bainbridge (1999).
2 See, e.g., Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) for evidence of the effects of insider trading and/or
insider trading regulation on stock markets as a whole.
3 See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for a description of agency conflict and agency costs.
4 Carlton and Fischel (1983) may also be categorized under the third view because they consider
the possibility that insider trading harms the firm by reducing liquidity of the firm's shares. But they
ultimately dismiss this possibility by arguing that if it were true, we would have observed firms volun-
tarily banning insider trading before it became illegal in the United States.
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across firms. According to those who espouse this view, firms in which
insider trading exacerbates the agency conflict will prohibit insider trading,
while firms in which insider trading mitigates the agency conflict will per-
mit insider trading.'
Although law and economics scholars have long stressed the need for
empirical evidence on the impact of insider trading on the intra-firm agency
conflict (see, e.g., Carlton and Fischel 1983; Easterbrook 1985), there were
few empirical studies on this topic until recently.6 Because insider trading
is illegal in virtually every country with a public stock market (Bhatta-
charya and Daouk 2002), it is impossible to conduct a direct empirical test
of whether insider trading exacerbates the agency conflict and whether pri-
vate contracting is superior to a mandatory ban.7 However, we can assess
these issues indirectly by exploiting cross-country variation in the strength
of insider trading laws and enforcement! If insider trading exacerbates the
agency conflict, we would expect insider trading regulation (assuming it is
effective) to be associated with higher corporate value because corporate
value is a proxy for agency costs (Morck et al. 1988). 9 This article investi-
gates the latter proposition by examining the relationship between the
strength of a country's insider trading laws and corporate value among
firms that have a controlling shareholder.
I focus on firms with a controlling shareholder for two reasons. First,
while a substantial part of the prior literature focuses on the conflict be-
tween managers and shareholders, the conflict between managers and con-
trolling shareholders on the one hand and minority shareholders on the
5 For empirical evidence on private restrictions of insider trading among Canadian firms, albeit in
the shadow of the insider trading prohibition, see Beny and Anand (2008).
6 The main evidence adduced by opponents of insider trading regulation, in support of their
deregulatory position, is the historical survival of insider trading in the United States prior to the enact-
ment of insider trading rules, without any apparent attempt by private parties to prohibit insider trading
(Carlton and Fischel 1983). According to Carlton and Fischel (1983), this evidence suggests that share-
holders did not perceive insider trading to exacerbate the agency conflict because, if they had, they
would have prohibited insiders from trading long before the legislature and the courts preempted the
issue. In response, Judge Easterbrook (1985) argues that the historical survival of insider trading in the
United States may have merely meant that the cost of such contracting was too high, not that sharehold-
ers had no desire to prohibit insider trading (Easterbrook 1985; see also Cox 1986). Recent empirical
studies on insider trading laws and enforcement include Maug and Ackerman (2006); Beny (2005,
2007); Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002, 2005); Bris (2005); and Dumev and Nain (2005). All of these
recent studies provide evidence on the cross-country implications of insider trading laws and enforce-
ment.
7 Also, the near-universal illegality of insider trading arguably places the burden on opponents of
insider trading regulation to show that such regulation is more costly than beneficial, since they seek to
change the status quo.
8 This is not possible at the domestic level unless, like Canada, a country exhibits state/provincial
variation in its insider trading laws and enforcement or one uses time series data for a single country that
span periods before and after the enactment of insider trading legislation.
9 See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for the original formulation of agency costs.
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other hand is more salient outside of the United States (La Porta et al.
2002). Second, testing the implications of insider trading laws in firms with
dispersed share ownership would require data on executive compensation
since insider trading profits may substitute for other forms of compensation
and insider trading may have a non-discernable impact on corporate value
(assuming there are no incentive effects) (Roulstone 2003; Noe 1997). Yet,
these data are not readily available for foreign corporations. In contrast,
data on the existence of controlling shareholders and their ownership and
control stakes are available. Controlling shareholders are subject directly or
indirectly to the insider trading prohibition in all of the countries in my
sample.
Based on a simple agency model of corporate value diversion through
insider trading by the controlling shareholder, I derive two empirically test-
able hypotheses about the relationship between corporate value and insider
trading laws: (1) more stringent insider trading laws increase firm value by
reducing the controlling shareholder's incentive to divert corporate value
through insider trading, and (2) more stringent insider trading laws and an
increase in the controlling shareholder's financial stake in the firm are sub-
stitute means to mitigate the agency conflict. I test these hypotheses using
firm-level data from a cross-section of large firms from twenty-seven de-
veloped countries. This article's central finding is that more stringent in-
sider trading laws and enforcement are associated with higher corporate
value for the sample firms in common law countries and unrelated to corpo-
rate value for the sample firms in civil law countries.'" Thus, the evidence
presented in this article does not support the claim that insider trading regu-
lation exacerbates agency costs in firms that have a controlling shareholder,
as some scholars argue (e.g., Demsetz 1986; Bhide 1993). As a result, the
evidence also does not support the call for deregulation of insider trading
(see, e.g., Carlton and Fischel 1983).
Section I of this article provides an overview of existing law, eco-
nomics, and finance literature that characterizes insider trading as an
agency issue and presents the two hypotheses. Section 1H describes the
data and presents descriptive statistics. Section IV outlines the empirical
methodology and presents the regression results. Section V addresses the
robustness of the results. Finally, Section VI concludes.
10 I do not find that cash flow ownership and insider trading laws are substitute means to control
agency costs within the firm. If anything, my findings suggest that insider trading laws and ownership
are complementary ways to mitigate agency costs, although this result is generally statistically insignifi-
cant.
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1I. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
This section summarizes prior literature characterizing insider trading
as an agency issue and presents two empirically testable hypotheses.
A. Insider Trading Ameliorates the Agency Conflict between Managers
and Shareholders
Manne (1966) was the first legal scholar to point out the potential
beneficial role of insider trading as a form of compensation. In Insider
Trading and the Stock Market, he argues that insider trading is valuable to
firms because it motivates insiders to be more entrepreneurial (Manne
1966). According to Manne (1966), "entrepreneurs" within the firm, and
their productive output, are difficult to identify ex ante. Thus, if corporate
insiders' compensation is set in advance, the compensation will be ineffi-
cient because it will not be calibrated to the insiders' ex post entrepreneurial
activity. In contrast, when corporate insiders are allowed to engage in in-
sider trading, they will be rewarded (via insider trading profits) in direct
proportion to and contemporaneously with their innovations. In this man-
ner, insider trading can maximize insiders' incentives to innovate and
thereby improve corporate performance.
Carlton and Fischel (1983) recast Manne's (1966) efficient compensa-
tion thesis within the modem framework of agency and contract theory. In
their view, capital and product markets do not adequately discipline or in-
centivize managers because these markets work imperfectly. Ex ante com-
pensation contracts are also deficient because they often require costly "pe-
riodic renegotiations ex post based on (imperfectly) observed effort and
output" (Carlton and Fischel 1983, 869).
In contrast, insider trading enables managers to continually update
their compensation in light of new information without incurring renegotia-
tion costs. Insider trading increases managers' incentives by linking their
"fortunes more closely to those of the firm" (Carlton and Fischel 1983,
877). More specifically, insider trading aligns managers' and shareholders'
interests by allowing managers to profit from the increase in firm value
caused by their efforts." Carlton and Fischel (1983) also argue that insider
trading improves the managerial labor market by reducing firms' screening
and monitoring costs 2 because the most capable and least risk averse man-
agers will self-select into the firms that permit insider trading.
I1 In response, opponents of insider trading argue that managers can also profit from corporate
failures that they have caused by taking short positions in their finns' stocks. See Section 11.B below.
12 Lower screening and monitoring costs imply lower agency costs.
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The theoretical economics and finance literature also contains several
accounts of insider trading as a mechanism to reduce the agency conflict
within the firm. Dye (1984) uses a mathematical model to prove Carlton
and Fischel's (1983) claim that insider trading may increase shareholder
wealth by better aligning manager and shareholder interests than standard
earnings-contingent contracts. Bebchuk and Fershtman (1993, 1994) show
that insider trading may enhance corporate value by increasing managers'
effort levels (Bebchuk and Fershtman 1993) or by causing managers to
select risky, but profitable, investment projects that would otherwise be
rejected if they were not allowed to trade on inside information (Bebchuk
and Fershtman 1994). The mathematical proofs of these propositions for-
malize Carlton and Fischel's (1983) non-technical arguments. Finally, Noe
(1997) demonstrates with a formal model that even if insider trading does
not increase insiders' effort levels, it may cost firms less (i.e., involve lower
managerial rents) than standard compensation contracts because of a "sub-
stitution effect between explicit managerial compensation and insider trad-
ing" profits (Noe 1997, 311). That is, when managers engage in insider
trading, firms pay them lower salaries. 3
B. Insider Trading Exacerbates the Agency Conflict between Managers
and Shareholders
Some law and economics scholars argue that, rather than aligning
shareholder and manager interests, insider trading may exacerbate the
agency conflict. Kraakman (1991) argues that, through insider trading,
managers may be able, ex post, to sabotage an efficient ex ante compensa-
tion contract and thereby counteract performance-based compensation
schemes intended to calibrate pay to productivity.
Cox (1986) argues that it is very difficult, in practice, to ensure that
those who create valuable information (i.e., entrepreneurial innovations) are
the only ones within the firm who are able to profit from it. To the extent
that the firm's "true" entrepreneurs cannot exclude other insiders from prof-
iting on the positive information, the "true" entrepreneurs' incentives to
innovate will be reduced rather than increased. Furthermore, the non-
excludability of insider trading profits may cause the firm's "true" entre-
preneurs to conceal their information to monopolize insider trading profits
and thus reduce the flow of information and productive efficiency within
the firm (Haft 1982).
13 Roulstone (2003) confirms the existence of a substitution effect between insider trading and
total compensation: "firms that restrict when insiders can trade pay a 4% to 13% premium in total com-
pensation relative to firms that do not restrict insider trading, after controlling for economic determi-
nants of compensation" (Roulstone 2003, 526).
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Some legal scholars also argue that allowing managers to trade on in-
side information may give them the incentives to take on too much risk or
to undertake projects that reduce corporate value. Because insider trading
is more profitable when stock prices are more volatile, insider trading may
encourage managers to undertake excessively risky projects in order to in-
crease volatility that would create private opportunities for profitable in-
sider trading but would reduce corporate value (Kraakman 1991). In addi-
tion, because managers can profit from insider trading regardless of corpo-
rate performance, insider trading may increase managers' incentive to un-
der-perform by making them indifferent between good and bad corporate
performance (Anabtawi 1989; Kraakman 1991; and Klock 1994). If corpo-
rate insiders are permitted to sell the firm's shares short, the potential prob-
lems of excessive risk-taking 14 and compensation unbundling, induced by
insider trading, may be worsened (Klock 1994).
Several theoretical economics and finance articles also demonstrate
that insider trading may worsen the agency conflict between managers and
shareholders. Manove (1989) formally demonstrates how insider trading
can reduce corporate value by discouraging investment because corporate
insiders "with private information are able to appropriate some part of the
returns to corporate investments ... at the expense of other shareholders"
(Manove 1989, 823).15 If shareholders suspect such appropriation, they will
favor a reduction in corporate investment. Bebchuk and Fershtman (1990)
show that insider trading may increase managers' incentive to "waste" cor-
porate value by encouraging them to make decisions that maximize their
potential trading profits rather than corporate value.
C. Insider Trading has an Indeterminate Impact on the Agency Conflict
between Managers and Shareholders
As noted above, some scholars are agnostic about whether insider trad-
ing is harmful to the firm and suggest that the effect of insider trading
probably varies across firms (Haddock and Macey 1987; Epstein 2004).
According to those who espouse this intermediate view, insider trading will
raise efficiency in some firms and reduce it in others. Like those who be-
lieve that insider trading reduces the agency conflict, proponents of the in-
termediate view tend to favor private contracting over insider trading regu-
lation because they view private parties as more capable than the govern-
ment of assessing the effect of insider trading on intra-firm efficiency (see,
e.g., Haddock and Macey 1987; Epstein 2004). Private contracting will
14 In response, some legal scholars argue that insider trading mitigates managers' excessive risk
aversion (Carlton and Fischel 1983).
15 Douglas (1989) also shows that the information asymmetry due to insider trading transfers
wealth from shareholders to insiders.
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promote varied and efficient responses to insider trading across firms, they
believe. Specifically, firms in which insider trading exacerbates the agency
conflict will privately prohibit insider trading, while firms in which insider
trading mitigates the agency conflict will privately permit insider trading.
Naturally, those who believe that insider trading worsens the agency con-
flict tend to advocate a blanket insider trading prohibition (see, e.g., Kra-
akman 1991; Cox 1986).
D. Dominant Shareholders: Insider Trading and Monitoring
Another strand of literature addresses the impact of insider trading
where there is a dominant (controlling) shareholder in the firm. By virtue
of their controlling position, large shareholders have greater access to cor-
porate management and, as a result, to material, nonpublic information.
Thus, like managers, large shareholders can earn greater profits from trad-
ing than, small shareholders can. There are two conflicting views about the
impact of insider trading on controlling shareholders' incentives to monitor
managers.
Demsetz (1986) and Bhide (1993) argue that insider trading increases
controlling shareholders' incentives to monitor managers. Controlling
shareholders are beneficial to firms, they argue, because these shareholders
have greater incentives to monitor managers (and thus to mitigate the man-
ager-shareholder agency conflict) than small, dispersed shareholders who
face collective action problems. However, holding a concentrated owner-
ship position imposes risks on the dominant shareholder, in particular the
risks of holding an undiversified portfolio (Demsetz 1986; Bhide 1993).
Thus, controlling shareholders must be compensated both for assuming the
risks of concentrated ownership and for monitoring managers (Demsetz
1986; Bhide 1993). Demsetz (1986) and Bhide (1993) argue that insider
trading profits are a convenient way to compensate controlling shareholders
for these activities. Restricting insider trading may therefore have a nega-
tive impact on corporate value by reducing controlling shareholders' incen-
tives to monitor by raising the costs and liabilities of active shareholding
(Demsetz 1986; Bhide 1993).
In contrast, Maug (2002) suggests that insider trading may adversely
affect controlling shareholders' incentives to monitor managers. In Maug's
(2002) view, large shareholders may use their dominance in the service of
their own (and managers') interests at the expense of small shareholders if
they are permitted to engage in insider trading.' 6 Using a mathematical
16 Along similar lines, La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that the primary agency problem in firms
with controlling shareholders "is not the failure of the Berle and Means (1932) professional managers to
serve minority shareholders, but rather the... expropriation of such minorities ... by controlling share-
holders" (La Porta et al. 1999, 3-4). The implication is that the law ought to be concerned not only with
[VOL. 4:2
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model, Maug (2002) shows how insider trading can induce large sharehold-
ers to expropriate corporate value from small shareholders rather than
monitor managers. In the model, when managers are performing poorly,
they may bribe dominant shareholders not to discipline them by sharing
private information with those shareholders. If the firm's stock is suffi-
ciently liquid, trading on such information is profitable and large share-
holders may prefer to trade on this information instead of monitoring man-
agers (i.e., foregone trading profits represent the opportunity cost of moni-
toring). In summary, Maug's (2002) model suggests that banning insider
trading may align the interests of controlling and minority shareholders; in
contrast, permitting insider trading may increase the likelihood that domi-
nant shareholders will collude with shirking managers, in exchange for
trading profits, at the expense of minority shareholders and corporate per-
formance.
The impact of insider trading on managers' and controlling sharehold-
ers' incentives, and thus on agency conflicts, is ultimately an empirical
question, which has yet to be satisfactorily answered (Easterbrook 1985).
This article attempts to answer this question indirectly by investigating the
relationship between corporate valuation and insider trading laws 'across
countries. 7 It builds upon La Porta et al.'s (2002) empirical study of the
relationship between investor protection and corporate valuation.
E. Hypotheses
This article tests two hypotheses regarding the effect of insider trading
regulation on the agency conflict in firms that have a controlling share-
holder. These hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (Hi): More stringent insider trading laws increase
firm value by reducing the controlling shareholder's incentive to
divert corporate value through insider trading.18
preventing managerial value diversion but also with containing expropriation by large shareholders (see,
e.g., La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta, et al. 1999; and Bukart and Panunzi 2006).
17 The article by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) is distinguishable in that they investigate the
relationship between the enactment and enforcement of insider trading laws and the aggregate cost of
capital across countries. Moreover, while Masson and Madhavan (1991) examine the relationship
between executives' insider trading and the marginal value of the firm, their study differs from the
present study in several important respects: it is based solely on U.S. data, it considers only legal (not
illegal) insider trading, and it does not address the role of insider trading law/enforcement as a potential
constraint upon executives' incentives to trade.
18 The alternative hypothesis is that insider trading laws have no impact (or a negative impact) on
corporate value.
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Hypothesis 1 (HI) addresses the first order effect of insider trading
laws on corporate value. As noted above, the literature contains conflicting
accounts of the effect of insider trading on the agency conflict (and hence
corporate value). Bhide (1993) and Demsetz (1986) argue that insider trad-
ing is beneficial because it compensates controlling shareholders for the
valuable monitoring role that they play. The implication is that prohibiting
insider trading will reduce controlling shareholders' incentives to monitor
managers, to the detriment of corporate value (Bhide 1993). Maug (2002)
counters with the claim that prohibiting insider trading will increase con-
trolling shareholders' incentives to monitor managers instead of colluding
with them at the expense of minority shareholders. Under Maug's (2002)
account, insider trading laws force controlling shareholders to internalize
the costs that insider trading imposes upon minority shareholders while
reducing their benefits from insider trading. HI, which adopts Maug's
(2002) view as the null hypothesis, puts these competing claims to the em-
pirical test.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Insider trading laws and the controlling
shareholder's financial stake in the firm are substitute means to
mitigate the agency conflict. Therefore, the more restrictive the
insider trading prohibition, the lower the marginal increase in
corporate value from an increase in the controlling shareholder's
financial stake in the firm.' 9
Hypothesis 2 (H2) predicts a substitution effect between the insider
trading prohibition and the controlling shareholder's financial stake in the
firm °.2  For the reasons explained above, the insider trading prohibition may
mitigate the conflict of interest between controlling and minority share-
holders. The financial stake of the controlling shareholder may also miti-
gate this conflict.2' Assuming that insider trading is costly to the firm, the
controlling shareholder will bear a greater share of this cost as her financial
stake in the firm increases. Thus, if insider trading is detrimental to the
firm, her incentive to trade will fall as her ownership stake in the firm in-
creases.
19 The alternative hypothesis is that insider trading laws and the controlling shareholder's finan-
cial stake are complementary ways to mitigate the agency conflict.
20 This prediction is analogous to the hypothesized substitution effect between executive compen-
sation and managers' profits from insider trading (Carlton and Fischel 1983). See Easterbrook (1985)
on the potential substitutability between insider trading laws and other mechanisms to mitigate the
agency conflict between managers and shareholders. See also Bukart and Panunzi (2006), who discuss
substitution between investor protection laws and alternative agency cost control devices.
21 This is the established insight that greater cash flow ownership by corporate insiders (managers,
large shareholders, etc.) lowers their incentives to divert corporate wealth from outside investors (see,
e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Shleifer and Vishny 1986).
[VOL. 4:2
HeinOnline  -- 4 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 276 2007-2008
Do INVESTORS VALUE INSIDER TRADING LAWS?
Assuming insider trading is detrimental, the substitution hypothesis
(H2) predicts that, as the controlling shareholder's financial stake increases,
the marginal valuation effect of an increase in the stringency of the insider
trading prohibition will fall. (Equivalently, as the insider trading prohibi-
tion becomes more stringent, the marginal valuation effect of an increase in
the controlling shareholder's financial stake will fall.)
Table 1 summarizes the article's empirically testable hypotheses.
III. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
In this section, I describe the data and present summary statistics.
A. The Data
La Porta and his co-authors (2002) shared their firm-level data with
me.22 They assembled valuation and ownership information for the twenty
largest firms (based on market capitalization) in twenty-seven developed
countries (based on 1993 per capita income). La Porta et al. (2002) focused
on large firms because it is more difficult to detect the beneficial impact of
investor protection laws on large firm corporate value.2 3 Their sample ex-
cludes firms that are foreign-affiliates as well as banks and other financial
institutions (La Porta et al. 2002). Most of the data are for 1995 and 1996,
but a few data points come from 1997 and two observations are from before
1995 (La Porta et al. 2002).
Like La Porta et al. (2002), I consider only firms that have an identifi-
able controlling shareholder. The rationale for such a focus is that control-
ling shareholders have superior access to inside information relative to
small shareholders, and therefore have a greater opportunity to engage in
insider trading by colluding with managers at the expense of small share-
holders. At the same time, controlling shareholders are better able to moni-
tor managers, in the interest of small shareholders, and presumably will do
so if they are adequately compensated. These competing tendencies high-
light the tension between the net effect of insider trading on controlling
shareholders' incentive to monitor managers and their incentive to expro-
priate value from minority shareholders (compare Bhide 1993 and Demsetz
22 1 use La Porta et al.'s (2002) data in part so I can compare the performance of my insider trad-
ing law index to the performance of their now classic investor protection measures. In a horse race in
regressions discussed below, my insider trading law index overcomes their investor protection measures.
See Section V below.
23 As La Porta et al. (2002) point out, large firms may have several alternative means to constrain
expropriation of minority investors, "including public scrutiny, reputation-building, foreign sharehold-
ings, or listings on international exchanges" (La Porta et al. 2002, 16). Consequently, the benefits of
legal constraints ought to be harder to detect in large firms.
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1986 with Maug 2002). I adopt La Porta et al.'s (2002) definition of con-
trol where a shareholder is deemed to have control over the firm if the
shareholder owns ten percent or more of the firm's voting shares.
B. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is Tobin's Q, a measure of corpo-
rate valuation and proxy for agency costs commonly used in corporate fi-
nance literature. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of the firm to the
replacement cost of its assets. 4 A larger Tobin's Q suggests that the market
values the firm more highly than firms with a lower Tobin's Q. A higher
Tobin's Q may result from the market's optimism about the firm's future
growth prospects because of good management, lower agency costs, favor-
able market conditions, or a high level of goodwill. I use La Porta et al.'s
(2002) measure of Tobin's Q, which they define as "the book value of as-
sets minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes plus the market
value of common stock" (i.e., the market value of assets) divided "by the
book value of assets" (La Porta et al. 2002, 1156). Controlling for other
factors that may affect corporate valuation, if insider trading laws mitigate
the agency conflict, and thereby reduce agency costs, firms in countries
with more stringent insider trading laws ought to have higher Tobin's Qs.
C. Independent Variables
Both countries' insider trading laws and controlling shareholders' fi-
nancial stakes in firms may influence the controlling shareholders' choice
between monitoring and colluding with managers, as discussed above.
Thus, I include measures of these characteristics as independent variables in
the regressions presented in Section IV.
Hypothesis 1 (HI) predicts that firms in countries with more stringent
insider trading laws have higher market valuations because such laws re-
duce controlling shareholders' incentive to divert corporate value through
insider trading. As a measure of the stringency of insider trading laws, I
use Beny's (2005) insider trading law index (ITL). ITL is an index of five
24 Tobin's Q is not a perfect measure of firm valuation since the numerator partly reflects the
market value of intangible assets and the denominator does not. See Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) for
a more thorough discussion of the pros and cons of Tobin's Q relative to alternative valuation measures.
Nevertheless, Tobin's Q is one of the most commonly used measures of corporate value in corporate
finance literature.
25 In Beny (2007) 1 explain, in more detail, the rationale for including each element of the law in
the insider trading law index. There is one minor difference, however, between the insider trading law
index in Beny (2007) and the one in this article, namely, the index in the former article excludes the
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substantive elements of each country's insider trading law: (1) whether the
law prohibits insiders from tipping outsiders; (2) whether the law prohibits
trading by tippees26 ; (3) whether the law provides a private right of action to
investors who traded opposite the insider(s) who in turn traded in violation
of the country's insider trading law; (4) whether the potential damages are a
multiple of the insider's trading profits; and (5) whether violation of the law
is a criminal offense. Each element is assigned the value of 0 or 1 and the
total ITL index is the sum of the individual elements. Thus, ITL equals five
in countries with the most prohibitive insider trading laws (e.g., the United
States) and ITL equals 0 in countries with the least prohibitive insider trad-
ing laws (e.g., Mexico and Norway).27 The insider trading laws of all the
countries in the sample prohibit insider trading by controlling shareholders,
either directly or indirectly. Thus, at least in theory, controlling sharehold-
ers who engage in illegal insider trading in these countries are subject to the
sanctions coded in the Beny (2005) index.
The insider trading laws on the books are one matter; whether they are
enforced, and to what degree, is another matter altogether. The laws' deter-
rent effect is a joint function of their substantive content and the probability
that they will be enforced (see, e.g., Zimring and Hawkins 1973). Unfortu-
nately, reliable international data on the frequency and degree of insider
trading enforcement are not available. Thus, for the time being, I must rely
on a fairly rudimentary enforcement measure. That measure is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if a country's insider trading law was enforced at
least once prior to 1994 and 0 otherwise.2" I call this measure Enforced and
I include it as an independent variable in the regressions. I also include the
interaction between (i.e., the product of) ITL and Enforced in the regres-
sions.
The underlying data from which I construct the variable Enforced are
from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) who report the year in which over one
hundred countries enforced their insider trading laws for the first time. This
measure of enforcement is admittedly problematic. That a country has en-
forced the law at least once by 1994 does not provide much insight on the
frequency and degree of enforcement. Nevertheless, it may be a proxy
private right of action component and treats it as a separate variable. The results in Beny (2007) are not
sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of the private right of action component, however.
26 Tippees are outsiders who receive material nonpublic information from corporate insiders who
are prohibited from trading on the basis of such information themselves.
27 All of the countries in the sample had insider trading laws on the books as of 1994. In fact,
most stock markets have insider trading laws, but the rate and timing of enforcement varies considerably
across markets. (See Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002 and Beny 2008).
28 1 chose 1994 as the cut-off date because the dependent variables come from the period of 1995-
1996 and the insider trading law indices are based on the sample countries' insider trading rules as they
existed around the same period. Both the content and the enforcement of these laws may have changed
in many of these countries since 1994. See Herrington (2004) for more recent measures of insider
trading rules and enforcement across countries.
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(even if a noisy one) for active enforcement based on the logic that having
been enforced once, a law is more likely to be enforced again. It may also
distinguish sham regimes from non-sham or partially-sham regimes. HI
predicts that the regression coefficients on both Enforced and the product of
ITL and Enforced will be positive.
Hypothesis 2 (H2) predicts a substitution effect between the insider
trading prohibition and the controlling shareholder's financial stake in the
firm. That is, H2 predicts that as the controlling shareholder's financial
stake increases, the marginal positive effect (on corporate value) of an in-
crease in the stringency of the insider trading prohibition will fall. As a
measure of the controlling shareholder's financial stake, I use La Porta et
al.'s (2002) measure of the proportion of the firm's cash flow rights directly
and indirectly owned by the controlling shareholder. I control for this
measure directly in the regressions because, as noted above, when the con-
trolling shareholder has a greater financial stake in the firm, she will bear a
greater proportion of any losses caused by the agency conflict that may be
exacerbated by insider trading. In addition, to test H2, I include the interac-
tion between (i.e., the product of) the insider trading law index, ITL, and the
controlling shareholder's financial stake as a separate independent variable
in the regressions. H2 predicts that the regression coefficient on this inter-
action term will be negative.
D. Control Variables
I include several additional control variables in the regressions below.
Prior research shows that corporate valuation is positively related to the
firm's investment opportunities. Following La Porta et al. (2002), I use
sales growth as a proxy for the firm's investment opportunities. La Porta et
al. (2002) define sales growth as the average annual rate of growth of the
firm's sales for the previous three-year period (or fewer years, if three
years' of sales data are unavailable).
Prior research also demonstrates that common law legal origin is posi-
tively related to the level of investor protection in a country and to the
country's degree of financial development and corporate valuation. Con-
versely, civil law legal origin is negatively related to investor protection,
financial development, and corporate valuation (see, e.g., La Porta et al.
1997, 1998, 2002).29 Therefore, I include a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the firm's country is a common law country and 0 if the firm's country is a
civil law country. I also control for industry because corporate valuation is
likely to vary systematically by industry, as discussed below.
The data are described in Table 2.
29 Roe (2006) argues, however, that politics explains different levels of financial development
across countries better than legal origin.
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E. Summary Statistics
Table 3 presents the mean and median values of several key variables
for the full sample and for each individual country in the sample. I divide
the sample into two regimes: Low ITL and High ITL. The cutoff between
High ITL and Low ITL is the median value of the interaction term,
ITL*Enforced, which equals two. I classify countries with a value of
ITL*Enforced, greater than the median of two, as High ITL regimes, while I
classify those with a value of ITL*Enforced, that is less than or equal to the
median of two, as Low ITL regimes. Consistent with HI, the High ITL
countries have higher mean and median values of Tobin's Q than the Low
ITL countries; the t-test statistic reveals that the difference in mean Tobin's
Q between the High ITL and the Low ITL countries is statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level. However, the difference in median Tobin's Q between
the High ITL and the Low ITL countries is not statistically significant.
Consistent with H2, Table 3 also shows that the controlling share-
holder tends to own a larger fraction of the firm's cash flows in the Low
ITL countries than in the High ITL countries. The differences in both mean
and median cash flow ownership between the two regimes are statistically
significant at the 1% level. Finally, mean and median sales growth are
higher in the High ITL countries than in the Low ITL countries, and the
difference is statistically significant at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively.
This suggests that the firms in the High ITL countries tend to have greater
investment opportunities than the firms in the Low ITL countries.
Table 4 presents the means by legal origin. The common law coun-
tries in the sample have a greater average value of ITL than the civil law
countries in the sample. This difference is statistically significant at the 1%
level. Nearly half of the common law countries have enforced their insider
trading laws at least once. In comparison, only twenty-five percent of the
civil law countries have enforced their insider trading laws at least once.
This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Average Tobin's
Q is higher for the firms in civil law countries than for the firms in common
law countries and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Finally, mean sales growth, a proxy for investment opportunities, is not
significantly different between the common law and civil law firms.
Table 5 presents simple correlations highlighting the relationship be-
tween Tobin's Q and several key variables. Tobin's Q is positively corre-
lated with ITL (correlation coefficient of 0.09 and 5% statistical signifi-
cance) and Enforced (correlation coefficient of 0.11 and 1% statistical sig-
nificance). Although they are not large, these correlations are consistent
with HI, which predicts a positive relationship between insider trading law
and corporate valuation (see Table 1). Tobin's Q is also positively corre-
lated with sales growth (correlation coefficient of 0.23 and 1% statistical
significance). While the magnitudes of the foregoing correlation coeffi-
cients are not large, they are consistent with ex ante expectations. Control-
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ling for other factors that may affect corporate valuation, multivariable re-
gression analysis will reveal whether the positive association between
Tobin's Q and insider trading laws withstands deeper scrutiny.
IV. METHODOLOGY AND REGRESSION RESULTS
A. Methodology
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2 (HI and H2), I estimate variations on the
following basic regression:
Tobin's Q = 130 + 13 SalesGrowth + f321TL + f33Ownership
+ 3 4ITL*Ownership + F
where Tobin's Q (the dependent variable) is a measure of corporate valua-
tion, SalesGrowth is the average annual rate of sales growth for the previ-
ous three years, ITL is the insider trading law index, Ownership is the con-
trolling shareholder's financial stake (cash flow rights) in the firm, and
ITL*Ownership is the product of the two previous variables. HI predicts
that B2 will be positive while H2 predicts that B 4 will be negative. I also
report alternative specifications to the basic regression, as explained below.
I consider a coefficient to be statistically significant if it is at least signifi-
cant at the 10% level.
I use random effects maximum likelihood estimation because the er-
rors are not independent within countries and this methodology takes into
account within and between country variation, adjusting the standard errors
to reflect the correlation among observations from the same country. In all
of the regressions reported below, the dependent variable is the log of 1
plus Tobin's Q. I take the log of Tobin's Q because its distribution is
skewed to the right and a log transformation of Tobin's Q yields a more
normal distribution. Each firm's Tobin's Q is adjusted by industry; for each
firm, Tobin 's Q equals its Tobin 's Q minus the worldwide median Tobin 's
Q for all of the firms in the same industry. The rationale for this adjustment
is to eliminate industry-specific components of valuation.
B. Results
Table 6 presents the results of random effects regressions. The regres-
sions in Panel A use the insider trading law index, ITL, while the regres-
sions in Panel B use the interaction term, ITL*Enforced. In all of the re-
gressions in both panels, the coefficient on sales growth is positive and sig-
nificant. In column (1) of Panel A, the coefficient on ITL is positive, con-
sistent with HI (see Table 1); however, it is statistically insignificant. In
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column (2) of Panel A, the coefficient on cash flow ownership of the con-
trolling shareholder is positive and significant at the 10% level. In column
(3) of Panel A, the coefficient on the interaction, ITL*Enforced, and cash
flow ownership is positive and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that
cash flow ownership and insider trading laws are complementary. This
result is inconsistent with H2 (the "Substitution" Hypothesis), which pre-
dicts a negative coefficient on the interaction between ITL and cash flow
ownership (see Table 1). Finally, none of the coefficients on the independ-
ent variables, except sales growth, are statistically significant when I in-
clude them jointly in a single regression in column (4) of Panel A.30 The
regressions in Panel B, which replace ITL with ITL*Enforced, but are oth-
erwise identical to the regressions in Panel A, yield similar results to those
in Panel A.
It may be inappropriate to lump all of the firms together, as I do in Ta-
ble 6, without allowing for heterogeneity-that is, systematic differences in
the effect of insider trading laws on agency costs-among the sample firms.
Prior research has shown that financial markets and corporate governance
structures differ significantly between common law and civil law countries
(see, e.g., La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). Consistent with this research, I find
significant differences by legal origin among the firms and countries in my
sample. For instance, the common law firms tend to have significantly
more liquid shares than the civil law firms. In addition, the ownership and
control stakes of controlling shareholders tend to be more closely aligned in
the common law firms than in the civil law firms. Moreover, controlling
shareholders are more likely to be corporations (as opposed to families, the
state, or financial institutions) in the common law firms relative to the civil
law firms. Finally, the common law countries have significantly greater
investor protections (as measured by La Porta et al.'s (1998) original anti-
director rights index), a significantly greater frequency of insider trading
law enforcement (as measured by the variable Enforced), significantly more
liquid stock markets, and a significantly greater frequency of corporate ac-
quisitions relative to the civil law countries.
Therefore, I allow for heterogeneity between the common law and
civil law firms by interacting the variables of interest with the dummy vari-
able for common law origin in a new set of regressions.3 I also address
multicollinearity between ITL and the interaction terms by centering ITL on
its sample mean. The dependent variable is still the log of 1 plus Tobin's
30 This may result from multicollinearity among these variables.
31 While country fixed effects estimation would be a preferable approach, I am unable to run fixed
effects regressions because the insider trading law variables already serve as country dummy variables.
Also, I do not split the sample into common law and civil law firms because that would reduce the
variation among the independent variables. Below, I discuss the effect of controlling explicitly for
several factors that one may expect to differ systematically between the common and civil law countries
and firms.
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Q, where, as explained above, Tobin's Q is adjusted by industry. The inde-
pendent variables are sales growth, cash flow ownership, centered-ITL, and
several interaction terms between common law origin and various other
variables that I explain as I present the results. The results are reported in
Table 7.
In column (1) of Table 7, the coefficient on centered-ITL is negative
but insignificant, while the coefficient on the interaction between centered-
ITL and common law is positive and significant at the 1% level. The re-
gression in column (2) is the same as the regression in column (1), except
that in column (2) I control for common law origin. This has two effects:
first, the coefficient on centered-ITL becomes significant at the 10% level;
and second, the net effect of cash flow ownership becomes negative for the
common law firms.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 7, I replace centered-ITL with the in-
teraction between centered-ITL and Enforced. The results in columns (3)
and (4) are consistent with those in columns (1) and (2). The coefficients
on centered-ITL*Enforced are negative (albeit insignificant) in columns (3)
and (4), while the coefficients on the interaction between centered-
ITL*Enforced and common law origin are positive and significant at the
respective 1% and 5% levels for the firms in common law countries." The
regressions in Table 7 also suggest that although cash flow ownership is
generally associated with greater corporate valuation (i.e., cash flow owner-
ship by the controlling shareholder has an incentive effect), this effect is
stronger for the firms in civil law countries than for the firms in common
law countries.33 Inconsistent with H2, the coefficients on the interaction
terms between cash flow ownership and the insider trading measures are
positive (see rows (8)-(11)), suggesting that cash flow ownership and in-
sider trading laws are complements rather than substitutes. However, these
coefficients are insignificant.
In summary, the results in Table 7 suggest that H1 accurately de-
scribes the firms in common law countries, but H1 does not accurately de-
scribe the firms in civil law countries. Specifically, insider trading laws are
positively associated with corporate valuation for the firms in common law
countries (see rows (4) and (5) of Table 7). In contrast, for the firms in civil
law countries, insider trading laws are (at best) irrelevant to corporate
valuation (see row (3) of Table 7) and (at worst) negatively associated with
corporate valuation (see row (2) of Table 7). While cash flow ownership of
the controlling shareholder is generally positively associated with corporate
valuation for the firms in civil law countries, the results on cash flow own-
ership are mixed for the firms in common law countries. Finally, inconsis-
32 The regression in column (4) differs from the regression in column (3) only in that it controls
for common law origin.
33 This result is consistent with Dumev and Kim (2005), who find that the incentive effect of cash
flow ownership is more important when investor protection is weaker, as it is in civil law countries.
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tent with H2, there does not appear to be a substitution effect between in-
sider trading law and the controlling shareholder's equity stake in the firm.
To the contrary, the coefficients in rows (8) through (11) in Table 7 suggest
that, if anything, there is a complementary relationship between cash flow
ownership and insider trading law. However, this relationship is statisti-
cally insignificant.
V. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this section, I address several potential robustness concerns. First, I
investigate whether the results are robust to controlling for a firm's indus-
try. The regressions in Tables 6 and 7 do not control for industry. How-
ever, corporate valuation may vary systematically by industry (see, e.g.,
Demsetz and Lehn 1985). Industry variation in corporate valuation may
result in some industries being inherently more prone than others to private
benefits extraction (i.e., "amenity potential," according to Demsetz and
Lehn 1985). Another reason for industry variation in valuation may stem
from different industries being at different stages of growth (La Porta et al.
2002). Thus, a common approach in the literature is to control for industry
in corporate valuation regressions (see, e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 1985;
Morck et al. 1988; and Claessens et al. 2002). I add industry dummies to
the regressions and substitute La Porta et al.'s (2002) industry-adjusted
sales growth variable for the raw sales growth measure. La Porta et al.
(2002) define industry-adjusted sales growth as the difference between the
firm's sales growth and the world median sales growth among firms in the
same industry. Using industry-adjusted sales growth instead of raw sales
growth controls for the possibility "that different industries may be at dif-
ferent stages of maturity and growth that determine their valuations" (La
Porta et al. 2002, 1159).
Second, I address the potential endogeneity of corporate ownership.
Thus far, I have assumed that the controlling shareholder's ownership stake
is exogenous, i.e., determined independently of the country's insider trading
laws. This assumption may be incorrect. La Porta et al. (1998) show that
corporate ownership tends to be more concentrated in countries with weak
investor protections than in countries with strong investor protections.
Similarly, in other work I show that ownership concentration is greater in
countries with lax insider trading laws than in countries with stringent in-
sider trading laws, controlling for legal origin, anti-director rights, and other
factors relevant to ownership concentration (Beny 2005). If the controlling
shareholder's ownership stake is endogenous to the country's legal rules
governing financial markets, the results in Table 7 may be biased. I address
this issue in the same manner as La Porta et al. (2002). They address the
issue by considering only "within-country variation in cash-flow ownership
(fixed effects estimation), which is arguably more exogenous to the legal
regime." They achieve this by replacing the raw measure of the controlling
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shareholder's cash flow ownership with the difference between the control-
ling shareholder's cash flow ownership at the firm level and the country
average of the same variable (La Porta et al. 2002, 1166).
The results of the foregoing adjustments are presented in Table 8. A
comparison of Tables 7 and 8 reveals that the results are substantively the
same after I make these adjustments.' 4
Another concern is whether the results are influenced by omitted vari-
ables. As discussed above, heterogeneity in the relationship between in-
sider trading laws and corporate valuation among the sample firms may
result from systematic differences between common law and civil law
countries in factors relevant to the relationship between insider trading laws
and corporate valuation. These factors include various financial, market,
regulatory and institutional characteristics. In Table 7, I address this issue
by interacting the insider trading law and ownership variables with common
law origin. However, if the data are available, it is preferable to control
directly for the relevant factors that may systematically differ between
common law and civil law countries.
I address omitted variables by explicitly controlling for several poten-
tially relevant financial, market, regulatory and institutional characteristics
of the sample countries and firms, including: (1) enforcement environment
and judicial efficiency; (2) liquidity of the firm's shares and the stock mar-
ket; (3) corporate disclosure; (4) market participants' perception of the se-
verity of insider trading in the stock market; (5) the firm's control structure
and the strength of the country's corporate law; (6) the market for corporate
control; and (7) the controlling shareholder's identity. I explain the ration-
ale and effect of controlling for each of these factors in turn.35
First, the results may derive from the general quality of the legal sys-
tem rather than insider trading law if countries with more stringent insider
trading laws also have more stringent enforcement, stronger rule of law, or
more efficient judiciaries than countries with less stringent insider trading
laws.36 I alternately control for each of these country characteristics using
the following variables: the dummy variable Enforced, which is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the country enforced its insider trading law for the first
34 The major differences between Tables 7 and 8 are that: (1) most of the statistically significant
coefficients in Table 7 become even more significant in Table 8; (2) the coefficient on centered-
ITL*Common Law becomes slightly smaller (compare row (4) in Table 7 with the same row in Table 8);
(3) the coefficients on centered-JTL*Enforced*Common Law decrease in magnitude (compare row (5)
of Table 7 with the same row in Table 8); and (4) the positive coefficient on cash flow ownership (row
(6) in Tables 7 and 8) becomes significant at the 5% level in every regression in Table 8, in contrast to
Table 7, where the coefficient on cash flow ownership (row (6)) is insignificant in column (1) and
significant at only the 10% level in column (2). Otherwise, the results in Tables 7 and 8 are essentially
the same.
35 I do not present the results of these regressions in the interest of brevity, but can provide inter-
ested readers with the results upon request.
36 Beny's (2005) evidence suggests that this is the case.
[VOL. 4:2
HeinOnline  -- 4 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 286 2007-2008
Do INVESTORS VALUE INSIDER TRADING LAWS?
time by 1994 and 0 otherwise; a measure of the rule of law from La Porta et
a]. (1998); and an index of judicial efficiency from La Porta et al. (1998).
Table 2 describes these variables in greater detail. The results are robust to
controlling for each of these variables.
Second, the different relationship between insider trading laws and
valuation between the common law and civil law firms may result from
systematic differences in share liquidity between the two legal systems.
Specifically, if common law firms tend to have more liquid shares than civil
law firms, and if there is a positive relationship between stock market li-
quidity and insider trading laws,37 the positive relationship observed be-
tween valuation and insider trading laws among the common law firms may
stem from the fact that these firms have more liquid shares than civil law
firms3" since investors are willing to pay a liquidity premium (Amiuhud and
Mendelson 1986; La Porta et al. 2002).
I investigate the effect of liquidity by controlling for both stock market
liquidity and individual firm liquidity using data from the World Bank and
Datastream. Both liquidity measures are described in detail in Table 2.
These data confirm that both stock markets and individual firm stocks are
more liquid in the common law sample countries.39 As expected, the coef-
ficients on both stock market liquidity and firm liquidity are positive and
significant in the Tobin's Q regressions. However, the results are robust to
controlling for both liquidity measures.'
Third, the regressions in Table 7 do not control for the quality of cor-
porate disclosure. Academics and lawmakers have long noted the close
relationship between disclosure rules and insider trading laws. More punc-
tual and higher quality disclosure ought to reduce insiders' opportunity to
trade profitably relative to the rest of the market (Baiman and Verrecchia
37 Georgakopoulos (1993) argues that it is only when the stock market becomes sufficiently liquid
that there is adequate social demand for insider trading regulation. The explanation could be that insider
trading is more profitable and thus more likely to occur the more liquid is the stock market, other things
equal (Maug 2002). But see Bhide (1993), who argues that causality runs from insider trading laws to
liquidity, rather than the reverse. In any event, stock markets do tend to be more liquid in countries with
more stringent insider trading laws and enforcement (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002; Beny 2005, 2007).
38 Civil law finns' shares may be relatively illiquid because ownership is more concentrated
among these firms. According to Bhide (1993), "when stockholding is fully diffuse, the firm's stock is
likely to be the most liquid." (Bhide 1993, 45-46). Consistent with this claim, Eleswarapu and Krish-
namurti (1999) find that ownership concentration and liquidity are inversely related among Indian firms.
39 Ownership (of the controlling shareholder) is also more concentrated among the civil law firms
(see Table 4).
40 La Porta et al. (2002) address liquidity indirectly by investigating whether the sample firms that
have American Depository Receipts (ADRs) traded in the U.S. have higher valuations than those with-
out ADRs. They find a small positive effect of ADRs for the common law firms but not for the civil law
firms, which is "inconsistent with the view that liquidity drives [their finding that valuation is greater for
common law firms than for civil law firms] since, on that theory, the benefit of an ADR for valuation
ought to be higher in less liquid markets (in civil law countries)" (La Porta et al. 2002, 1165).
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1996; Fried 1997; Maug 2002; and Shin 1996). 4' I control for two measures
of disclosure. First, I control for the quality of accounting standards, as
reported by La Porta et al. (1998). This index ranks countries according to
the quality of their corporate disclosure practices as of 1990. Second, I
control for a measure of legal disclosure requirements, constructed by La
Porta et al. (2006). This index measures how much corporate governance-
relevant information firms are legally required to include in their offering
prospectuses. I describe both disclosure variables in more detail in Table 2.
Alternately controlling for these disclosure variables has no effect on the
results reported above.
Fourth, the results may arise because I do not control for the public
perception of insider trading. A perception that insider trading is more
prevalent in common law countries may explain why insider trading regula-
tion is more strongly and positively associated with corporate valuation in
such countries. To address this issue, I control for the perception of insider
trading, using a measure from the World Economic Forum's Global Com-
petitiveness Report 1996 (1996), which is described in Table 2. Controlling
for the perception of insider trading does not alter the results. In fact, for
the countries in my sample, the public perception of insider trading is
greater among the civil law countries than among the common law coun-
tries. This suggests a plausible alternative interpretation of the results,
namely, holding constant the public perception of insider trading activity,
the investing public may view insider trading regulations to be less effec-
tive at controlling such activity in civil law countries than in common law
countries. However, it may also mean that there are offsetting benefits to
insider trading in civil law countries. I discuss these issues in more detail
below.
Fifth, the results may result from systematic differences in controlling
shareholders' incentive and ability to extract private benefits. Such differ-
ences may be caused by systematic differences in corporate control struc-
tures, corporate laws, or some combination thereof, between civil law and
common law countries. Consider Maug's (2002) theoretical framework in
which large shareholders face a tradeoff between monitoring and engaging
in insider trading.42 Other things equal, the greater the controlling share-
41 Indeed, an important pillar of U.S. insider trading legislation is the "disclose or abstain" rule,
which requires that insiders either disclose material nonpublic information or refrain from trading on the
basis of such information. See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). Several
other countries effectively follow the "disclose or abstain" approach.
42 Managers may bribe large shareholders not to monitor by giving them private information on
which they can profitably trade. If large shareholders' marginal payoffs from trading are greater than
their marginal payoffs from monitoring, they will choose trading over monitoring (Maug 2002).
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holder's incentive and ability to extract private benefits, the more likely she
is to trade rather than to monitor at the margin.43
As a proxy for the controlling shareholder's incentive to extract pri-
vate benefits I use the "control wedge," which is the divergence between
the controlling shareholder's control and ownership stakes in the firm,
which I borrow from La Porta et al. (2002).4 The larger the control wedge,
the greater the deviation from one-share-one-vote and thus, the greater the
controlling shareholder's incentive to extract private benefits at the expense
of minority shareholders (Grossman and Hart 1988; Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny 1988; Harris and Raviv 1988; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Bebchuk,
Kraakman, and Triantis 2000; and La Porta et al. 2002). Consistent with
this, empirical research has shown that there is a tradeoff between owner-
ship and control, with corporate valuation increasing in the controlling
shareholder's cash flow ownership (the incentive effect) and decreasing in
the controlling shareholder's voting control (the entrenchment effect)
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988; Claessens et al. 2002; Morck, Stange-
land, and Yeung 2000; and Durnev and Kim 2005).
As a proxy for the controlling shareholder's ability to extract private
benefits, I use three measures of the stringency of a country's corporate
laws (i.e., investor protection): (1) La Porta et al.'s (1998) original anti-
director rights index; (2) Djankov et al.'s (2006) revised anti-director rights
index; and (3) Djankov et al.'s (2006) anti-self-dealing index.45 Alternately
controlling for the control wedge and each investor protection variable does
not alter the results. In fact, the insider trading law variables overcome La
Porta et al.'s (1998) original anti-director rights index and Djankov et al.'s
(2006) revised anti-director rights and anti-self-dealing indices. The coeffi-
cients on the insider trading law variables remain positive and significant
for the common law sample firms, while the coefficients on the anti-
director and anti-self-dealing variables are insignificant.
Sixth, it may be inappropriate to ignore the market for corporate con-
trol. Corporate takeovers provide a fertile and common context for insider
43 However, for this logic to explain the results in Tables 7 and 8, it ought to be the case that
controlling shareholders have greater incentives to expropriate private benefits in the common law
countries. But that does not describe the empirical pattern revealed in the law and finance literature.
44 I use two measures of the control wedge, the arithmetic difference and the ratio between the
controlling owner's control and ownership stakes. The results are the same with either measure.
45 La Porta et al. (2002) find that common law origin and stronger anti-director rights are associ-
ated with higher corporate valuation for their same sample of firms. The results above may be driven by
anti-director rules, rather than by insider trading laws, if countries that have stricter anti-self-dealing
corporate laws also tend to have more stringent insider trading laws. Indeed, they do for this sample.
The correlation coefficients are 0.36 (significance 1%) between the original anti-director rights index
(La Porta et al. 1998) and ITL; 0.27 (significance 1%) between the revised anti-director rights index
(Djankov et al. 2006) and JTL; and 0.44 (significance 1%) between the anti-self-dealing (Djankov et al.
2006) index.
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trading.' The more competitive the market for corporate control, the
greater the potential profits from trading on the basis of private information
about an impending takeover, because greater competition increases take-
over premia (Burkart et al. 1998). The market for corporate control is less
competitive when control is more closely held, as it tends to be among
firms in civil law countries (see, e.g., Dyck and Zingales 2004; Nenova
2003). In addition, holdout problems are less severe when ownership is
more concentrated, as it tends to be in firms in civil law countries, driving
down the price of corporate acquisitions. For these reasons, corporate take-
overs may present less lucrative trading opportunities in civil law countries,
other things equal. In short, if the market for corporate control is less com-
petitive in civil law countries than in common law countries, this may
partly explain the apparent irrelevance of insider trading laws to corporate
valuation in the sample civil law firms to the extent that most insider trad-
ing occurs around takeovers.47
Therefore, I control for three measures of the market for corporate
control. First, I control for the average percent of acquisitions that were
successful between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1999 from Bris
(2005). Second, I control for the ratio of the average per capita market
value of acquisitions in constant U.S. dollars between January 1, 1990 and
December 31, 1999 from Bris (2005) to GDP in 1995 U.S. dollars. Finally,
I control for the average percent of acquisitions that were hostile between
January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1999 from Bris (2005). In addition to
the preceding measures of the market for corporate control, I also use the
mean and median values of the block premium as a percentage of firm eq-
uity value from Dyck and Zingales (2004). Dyck and Zingales (2004) use
the block premium to infer the private benefits of control across countries.
The block premium may also be a proxy for the degree of competition in
the market for corporate control, a higher (lower) block premium suggest-
ing less (more) competition in the market for corporate control. Bris'
(2005) corporate control and Dyck and Zingales' (2004) block premia data
are described in greater detail in Table 2. Alternately controlling for the
46 Two recent studies that document insider trading around corporate takeovers are Ackerman and
Maug (2006) and Bris (2005). Bris (2005) studies the relationship between the profitability of insider
trading around corporate takeovers and insider trading law and enforcement, finding that insider trading
is less profitable when the law is more stringent. Ackerman and Maug (2006) study the relationship
between insider trading laws and enforcement and the predictability of takeover announcement returns
and find that there is less private information trading in stock markets governed by more stringent in-
sider trading laws. Both Bris (2005) and Ackerman and Maug (2006) use Beny's (2005) index of in-
sider trading law.
47 Bris' (2005) data suggest that the likelihood of a corporate takeover is greater in common law
countries, although the relative market value of a corporate takeover seems to be larger in civil law
countries. It is unclear which way this information cuts.
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preceding measures of the market for corporate control and the block pre-
mium does not alter the results."u
Seventh, the identity of the controlling shareholder may be relevant if
different controlling shareholders have different incentives to extract pri-
vate benefits of control. For example, a controlling shareholder that is a
family may have stronger incentives or proclivity to engage in insider trad-
ing than a controlling shareholder that is a corporation.49 Perhaps civil law
and common law countries have a differential prevalence of types of con-
trolling shareholders. Thus, I control for the controlling shareholder's iden-
tity using La Porta et al.'s (2002) data (see Table 2). This does not change
the results.
The results are also robust to controlling for GDP per capita. In fact,
the civil law countries of my sample have slightly higher average GDP per
capita than the common law countries, although the difference is statisti-
cally insignificant. Finally, I check whether any country drives the results
by sequentially dropping each country from the regressions in Table 7. No
single country drives the results.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article yields two main findings. First, for the sample firms in
common law countries, insider trading laws and enforcement are positively
associated with higher corporate valuation. This evidence supports the
claim that insider trading regulation mitigates agency costs. In contrast, the
relationship between valuation and insider trading law is negative (but gen-
erally insignificant) for the firms in civil law countries. Second, the results
do not support the notion that cash flow ownership and insider trading laws
are substitute means to control agency costs. If anything, the results sug-
gest that insider trading laws and equity ownership are complementary
ways to mitigate agency costs, although this finding is generally statistically
insignificant.
The result that insider trading laws are positively associated with cor-
porate valuation in the common law countries but not in the civil law coun-
tries, even though I control for many relevant characteristics that may sys-
tematically differ between common and civil law countries, is puzzling.
There are at least two possible explanations for this result. The first poten-
48 None of the coefficients on Bris' (2005) acquisition measures is significant. However, the
coefficients on Dyck and Zingales' (2004) block premia measures-mean block premium and median
block premium-are negative and significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
49 Hung and Trezevant (2004) find that insiders of Southeast Asian firms that are controlled by the
wealthiest families seem to be especially aggressive in trading on inside information. Their data are for
firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. My sample does not include firms from any
of these countries.
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tial explanation is an economic rationale. Demsetz (1986) and Bhide
(1993) suggest that insider trading laws have a perverse effect on corporate
value by reducing large shareholders' incentives to engage in corporate
monitoring because these laws reduce insider trading profits, which com-
pensate for such monitoring. Perhaps the results can be seen in this light-
that is, insider trading laws may discourage large shareholders from moni-
toring in civil law countries but not in common law countries. However,
the negative relationship between insider trading laws and corporate valua-
tion among the civil law firms is generally statistically insignificant, which
is inconsistent with Demsetz' (1986) and Bhide's (1993) hypothesis. In-
stead, the results suggest that insider trading laws may have a beneficial
impact on monitoring at best and no effect at worst.
The second potential explanation for the difference between common
law and civil law firms is a legal/institutional rationale. More specifically,
insider trading laws may be relatively ineffective in civil law countries.
Indeed, recent research suggests that insider trading laws are less effective
in countries where investor protections are relatively weaker, as in civil law
countries. Durnev and Nain (2005) argue that, where investor protection is
sufficiently weak and controlling shareholders are prohibited from trading,
these shareholders may compensate for lost trading profits by engaging in
various covert forms of expropriation. In addition, Durnev and Nain (2005)
find that if investor protection is sufficiently weak, "private information
trading may remain unchanged and even increase in the presence of insider
trading restrictions" (Durnev and Nain 2005, 22).50 Similarly, Grishchenko
et. al. (2002) find that "stocks . . . that provide better investor protection
[and information disclosure] exhibit less private information trading"
(Grishchenko et. al. 2002, 1). In contrast, Durnev and Nain (2005) find that
insider trading laws unambiguously reduce private information trading "in
countries where shareholder rights are well protected" (Durnev and Nain
2005, 22).5" Furthermore, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2005) suggest that the
cost of equity (a proxy for agency costs) may actually increase when a
country merely enacts, but does not enforce, insider trading legislation.
The problem with the legal/institutional explanation is that the com-
mon law-civil law dichotomy is robust to controlling for various legal and
institutional differences among the countries in my sample. Nevertheless,
the robustness of the dichotomy to such controls may arise because the ex-
isting legal and institutional data are unsatisfactory. If that is the case,
50 According to Dumev and Nain (2005), "[t]he opaque informational environment that often
accompanies covert activities of controlling shareholders can, in turn, increase the information acquisi-
tion activity of market professionals who trade at the expense of uninformed investors" (Durnev and
Nain 2005, 25).
51 Similarly, Ackerman and Maug's (2005) evidence suggests that insider trading laws have a
greater impact "in countries with more effective" judicial systems; but, there is no reason to expect
judiciaries to be more efficient in common law countries than in civil law countries.
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comparative law and finance scholars ought to construct better measures of
the legal order and, particularly, the securities regulatory and enforcement
environment (see La Porta et al. 2006 for a recent comparative study of
securities laws and enforcement).
Over the past two decades, there has been a concerted international ef-
fort to encourage countries to adopt insider trading laws and to vigorously
enforce such laws (Haddock and Macey 1986; Gevurtz 2002). However,
the results of this article suggest that insider trading laws are not uniformly
associated with corporate valuation, a proxy for agency costs, across coun-
tries. Indeed, the results suggest that insider trading laws may not be an
effective way to reduce agency costs in civil law countries. Consequently,
this article's results could be read to support contractualists who oppose a
one-size-fits-all approach (i.e., a mandatory prohibition) to insider trading
(Carlton and Fischel 1983; Haddock and Macey 1987; and Epstein 2004).52
Such a reading of the results of this article is unwarranted, however. If
the contractualists are to satisfy the burden of proving that mandatory in-
sider trading laws exacerbate agency costs, they must show that stringent
insider trading laws have a negative net impact on corporate valuation.53
Thus far, they have not met this burden. Moreover, the evidence in this
article does not support such a claim. Rather, I find that insider trading
laws are either positively associated with corporate value (in common law
countries) or are unrelated to corporate value (in civil law countries). In
addition, private contractual approaches to insider trading are inherently
problematic because of transaction costs, uncertainty, and externalities,54
and may be unenforceable by private parties (see, e.g., Easterbrook 1985;
Cox 1986). Furthermore, the apparent insignificance of insider trading laws
to firms in civil law countries may stem from relatively lax enforcement of
these laws in civil law countries (see Jackson and Roe 2006). If that is the
case, the appropriate policy response may be greater sanctions and more
stringent enforcement, not repeal of insider trading laws, in the latter coun-
tries.
52 The reader will recall that contractualists include those who believe that insider trading miti-
gates the agency conflict (e.g., Carlton and Fischel 1983) and those who espouse the intermediate,
agnostic position (e.g., Haddock and Macey 1987; Epstein 2004).
53 The near-universal illegality of insider trading arguably places the burden on opponents of
insider trading regulation to show that such regulation is more costly than beneficial, since they seek to
change the status quo.
54 Negative externalities are an especially important consideration in the insider trading debate,
which both this article and much of the agency literature on insider trading abstract from. Studies that
address some potential negative external effects of insider trading include Baiman and Verrecchia
(1996); Beny (2005, 2007); Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002); Bushman et al. (2005); Cox (1986); Du
and Wei (2004); Fishman and Hagerty (1992); Georgakopoulos (1993); Goshen and Parchomovsky
(2001); Klock (1994); Kraakman (1991); and Shin (1996). Glaeser et al. (2001) address the general
issue of public versus private regulation of stock markets.
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In conclusion, while the results of this article suggest that the intra-
firm impact of insider trading laws may depend on the local context in
which such laws are applied (or not applied, as the case may be), they do
not support calls for deregulation of insider trading.
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Table 1
Summary of Testable Hypotheses
Hypothesis Dependent Variable Hypothesized Relationship
to Corporate Value
HI Insider Trading Law Positive
H2 Cash Flow Ownership of the Controlling Shareholder Positive
H3 Insider Trading Law*Cash Flow Ownership Negative
of the Controlling Shareholder
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Description of Variables
Dependent Variables
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q is defined as the market value of assets divided by their replacement value at the close of
the most recent fiscal year. The market value of assets is measured by the book value of assets minus
the book value equity minus deferred taxes plus the market value of common stock. The replacentent
value of assets is approximated by the book value of assets (La Ports et al. 2002).
Industry-Adjusted The indstry-adjusted Tobin's Q for a given firm is defined as the difference between that firm's To-
Tobin's Q bin's Q and the wortd median Tobin's Q among firms in the same industry. ndustry reference groups
ame defined at the threedgit S.I.C. level if there are at least five WorldScope firms (not including the
sample fints) in the group and, if nol, at the two-digit S.LC. level (La Ports et al. 2002).
Cash Flow to The cash flow to prie ratio is computed as the sum of esrings (net income before extramtnary
Price Ratio items) and deprecintion. When cash flow is negative, the cash flow to price ratio is assigned a missing
value. The average cash flow to price ratio for the three most recent fiscal year is reported in U.S.
dollars. Price, in U.S. dollars, is the market value of common equity at the end of the most recent
fiscal year (La Ports at al 2002).
Industry-Adjusted The industry-adjusted cash flow to price ratio is defined as the difference between the firm's cash
Cash Flow to flow to price ratio and the world median cash flow to price ratio among firms in the same industy.Industry control groups are defined in the same manner as for industry-adjusted Tobin's Q (see above)
Price Ratio (La Port et al. 2002).
Insider Trading Law Variables
lpping Tipping equals I if corporate insiders am prohibited from tipping outsiders (tppees) about material
nonpublic information and/or encouraging them to trade on such information for personal gain; equals
0 otherwise (Gaillard 1992; Stamp and Welsh 1996).
71ppee Tippee equals I if tippees, like corporate insiders, am prohibited from trading on material nonpublic
information that they have received from corporate insiders; equals 0 otherwise (Gaillard 1992;
Stamp and Welsh 1996).
Damages Damages equals I if potential monetary penalties for violating insider trading laws are proportional to
insiders' trading profits; equals 0 otherwise (Gaillard 1992; Stamp and Welsh 1996).
Criminal Criminal equals I if violation of insider trading laws is a potential criminal offense; equals 0 other-
wise (Gaillard 1992; Stamp and Welsh 1996).
Private Private equals I if private parties have a private right of action against parties who have violated the
country's insider trading laws (Gaillard 1992; Stamp andWelsh 1996).
ITL The aggregate insider trading law index, ITL, equals the sum of (t) Tipping; (2) Tippee; (3) Damages;
(4) Criminal; and (5) Private. Equivalently, the sum of Scope, Sanction and Private. IT Law ranges
from 0 to 5, with 0 representing the most lax formal insider trading law and 5 representing the most
restrictive insider trading law (Gaillard 1992; Stamp and Welsh 1996).
Enforced A proxy for actual enforcement, Enforced by 1994 is an indicator variable that equals I if the
country's insider trading law has been enforced for the first time by the end of 1994 (Bhattchsrya
and Danuk 2002).
ITL*Enforced IT Law times Enforced by 1994.
Ownership and Control Variables
Control Rights "The fraction of the firm's voting rights, if any, owned by its controlling shareholder. To meas= con.
trol we combine a shareholders direct (i.e., through shares registered in her name) and indirect (i.e.,
through shares held by entities that, in turn, she controls) voting rights in the firm. A shareholder has
an x% indirect control over firm A if; (1) she controls directly firm B which, in ture, directly controls
x% of the votes in firm A; or (2) she controls directly firm C which in turn controls firm B (or a se-
quence of firms leading to firm B each of which has control over the next one, i.e., they form a control
chain) which, in turn, directly controls x% of the votes in firm A. A group ofn companies form a
chain of control if each firm I through n - I controls the consecutive firm. A firm in our sample has a
controlling shareholder if the sum of her direct and indirect voting rights exceeds 10%. When two or
more shareholders meet our criteria for control, we assign control to the shareholder with the largest
(direct plus indirect) voting stake" (La Porta et al. 2002,1157).
Cash Flow Rights "Ultimate cash flow right of the controlling shareholder in the sampl firm. CF Rights am computed
us the product of all the equity stakes along the control chain (see description of Control Rights for an
explanation of'control chainsT (La Ports et al. 2002,1157).
Country-Adjusted Calenlated by taking the difference between the cash flow ownership of the controlling owner of a
given firm and the countrywide mean cash flow ownership of controlling sharehlders (La Ports etCash Flow Rights :a. 2002).
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Description of Variables
Additional Variables
Sales Growth Sales growth is computed by the geometric average annual percentage growth in lagged net sales for
up to three years conditional on availability of the data. Sales are reported in U.S. dollars (La Porta
et al. 2002).
Industry-Adjusted Industry-adjusted sales growth is defused as the difference between the fl-e's sales growth (SG) and
Sales Growth the world median SG among firms in the same industry. Industry control groups are defined in the
same manner as for industy-adjusted Tobin's Q (see above) (La Porta et al. 2002).
Common Law A dummy variable that equals I if the legal origin ofthe country is English common law and 0
otherwise (La Porta et al. 1998; CIA 2000).
Industry Industry reference groups are defined at the three-digit S.I.C. level if there are at least five World-
Scope firms (not including the sample firms) in the group and, if not, at the two-digit S.I.C. level (La
Porta et al. 2002).
Rule of Law The nle of law measure is an "(alssessment of the law and order tradition in the country. Averge of
the months ofApril and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10,
with lower scores for less tradition for law and order" (La Porta et al. 1998, 1124). La Ports et al.
(1998) compile this variable from the International Country Risk Guide. A higher role of law score
signifies that the legal system is relatively more capable of resolving disputes and enforcing contracts.
Judicial Efficiency The index ofjudicial efficiency is an "[a]tssesamen of the 'efficiency and integrity of the legal envi-
ronment as it affects business, particularly foreign fitrs,- averaged from 1980-1983 (La Ports et al.
1998, 1124). La Porta et al. (1998) get this variable from Business lnternational Corporation.
Stock Market Stock market liquidity is meastred as stock market value traded divided by GDP (World Bank 1995).
Liquidity
Firm Liquidity Individual firm liquidity is measured as the average monthly turnover ratio, i.e., the total value traded
divided by total market capitalization, from January 1, 1994 to December I, 1996. (Thompson
Financial 2007).
Disclosure Index The Disclosure index equals the arithmetic average of five separate indices of information that firms
are legally required to include in their prospectuses: (1) Compensation; (2) Shareholders; (3) Inside
Ownership; (4) Irregnlar contracts; (5) Transactions.
(1) Compensation is "an index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the compensation of
the lssuer'sdirectors and key officers. Equals I if the law or the listing ndes require that the compen-
sation of each director and key officer be reported in the prospectus of a newly-listed firm; equals .5 if
only the aggregate compensation of directors and key officers must be reported in the prospectus of a
newly listed firm; and equals 0 when there is no requirement to disclose the compensation of directors
and key officers in the prospectus for a newly isted firm" (La Ponta et al. 2006, 6). The Issuer is a
domestic cotporation that raises capital through an initial public offering of common shares. (Id.)
(2) Shareholders is lan index of disclosure requirements regarding the Issuersequity ownership
structure. Equals I if the law or the listing rules require disclosing the name and ownership stake of
each shareholder who, directly or indirectly, cotrols 10% or more of the Issuer's voting securities;
equals .5 if reporting requirements for the Issuer's 10% shareholders do not include indirect owner-
ship or if only their aggregate ownership needs to be disclosed; and equals 0 when the law does not
require disclosing the name and ownership stake of the Issuers 10% shareholders. [No distinction
is drawn between] large shareholder reporting requirements imposed on firms with these imposed on
large sharebolders themselves" (La Ports et al. 2006, 6).
(3) Inside Ownership is "lain index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the equity
ownership of the Issuersshares by its directors and key officers. Equals I if the law or the listing
rules require that the ownership of the Issuersshares by each of its directors and key officers be
disclosed in the prospectus; equals .5 ifonly the aggregate number of the Issuer"sshares owned by
its directors and key officers must be disclosed in the prospectus; and equals 0 when the ownership
of Issuer s shares by its directors and key officers need not be disclosed in the prospectus (La Parts
et al. 2006, 6).
(4) Irregular contracts is "[a]n index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer scon-
tracts outside the ordinary course of business. Equals I if the law or the listing roles require that the
terms of material contracts made by the Ismer outside the ordinary corse of its business be disclosed
in the prospectus; equals .5 if the terms of only some material contracts made outside the ordinary
course of business must be disclosed; and equals 0 otherwise" (La Ports et al. 2006, 6).
(5) Transactions is la]n index of the prospectus disclosure requirements regarding transaction
between the Issuer and its directors, officers, and/or large shareholders (i.e., 'related pardes'). Equals
I if the law or the listing rules require that all transactions in which related parties have, or will have,
an interest be disclosed in the prospectus; equals .5 if only some transactions between the Issuer and
related parties must be disclosed in the prospectus; and equals 0 if transactions between the Issuer and
related parties need not be disclosed in the prospectus" (La Parts et al. 2006, 6).
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Description of Variables
Additional Variables
Accounting Standards The accounting index is a measure of the quality of accounting standards. The accounting index as-
Index signs a rating to companies' 1990 annual reports on the basis of their inclusion or exclusion of ninetyitems. The ninety items are divided into seven categories (general information, income statements,
balance shoots fimds flow statement, accountiog standards, stock data, and special items). For each
country, the index is based on examination of a minimum of three companies. The companies repre-
sent a cross-section of various industries. 70% are industrial cosmpanies, while the remaining 30% are
financial cospanie (La Porta et al. 1998).
Perception of The perception of insider trading is based on a survey that asks corporate executives many questions,
insider Trading including whether insider trading is common in their domestic stock markets. The variable ranges
from I to 6, with I indicating that corporate executives strongly agree, and 6 indicating that corporate
executives strongly disagree, that insider trading is common in their domestic stock markets (World
Economic Forum 1996).
Control Wedge The control wedge is the differenoc between the controlling hareholder's control rights and cash flow
rights (La Porta et a]. 2002).
Original The original anti-director rights index is"]oresed by adding I when: (1) the country allows share-
Anti-Director holders to mail the proxy vote to the firm; (2) shareholder are not required to deposit their shaes
prior to the general shareholders' meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of
Rights Index minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place;
(5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary
shareholders meeting is less than or equal to 10% (the sample median); or (6) shareholders have
preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders' vote. The index ranges from I to 6' (La
Port etal. 1998,1123).
Revised The revised anti-director rights index "relies on the same basic dimensions of cosporate law [as the
Anti-Director original anti-director rights index] but defines them with more precision.... The general principle
behind the construction of the revised anti-director rights index is to associate better investor protec-
Rights Index tion with laws that explicitly mandate, or set as a default rule, provisions that are favorable to minor-
ity shareholders" (Djankov et a]. 2006, 30).
Anti-Self-Dealing The average of the ex-ante and ex-post indices of the private control of self-dealing transactions. The
Index index of ex-ante control of self-dealing transactions is the "[a]verage of approval by disinterested
shareholders and ex-ante disclosure" (Djankov et a]. 2006,47). The index of ex-post control of self-
dealing transactions is the "[a]vemge of disclosure in periodic filings and ease of proving wrongdo-
ing" (Djankov et at. 2006,48).
Measures of The three measures of the market for corporate control include: (I) the average p rcent of acquisi-
the Market for tions that were successfal between Januay 1, 1990 and December 31,1999; (2) the average per
capita market value of acquisitions in constant U.S. dollars betwen January 1, 1990 and December
Corporate Control 31, 1999 divided by GDP in 1995 U.S. dollars; and (3) the average percent of acquisitions that were
hostile between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1999. The corporate control data come from Bris
(2005), whose "total sample includes all takeover announcements that took place between January
1, 1990 and December 31, 1999, available in the Securities Data Corporate Mergers and Acquisi-
tions database. Only public companies are considered, and [be] exclude[s] LBO deals, spinoffs,
recopitaliations, self-tender and exchange offers, repurchases, minority stake purchases, acquisitions
of remaining interest, ad privatizations. Second and subsequent bids that occur within a window
of four years relative to an initial announcement are xcluded. A bid is considered Hostile when the
hoard officially rejects the offer but the acquirer persists with the takeover, or if the offer is a surprise
to the target's board and the [board] has not yet given a recommendation. A deal is successful when
it has been either totally or partially completed" (Bris 2005, Table 1, 272). The GDP data come from
the World Bank World Development Report CD-ROM (2003).
Block Premium The block premium is "the difference between the price per share paid for the control block and the
price on the Exchange two days after the announcement of the control transaction, divided by the
price on the Exchange after the announcement and multiplied by the proportion of cash flow rights
represented in the controlling block" (Dyck and Zingales 2004, 547). Dyck and Zingales (2004) esti-
mate control block premia for 39 countries using 393 controlling block sales beween 1990 uad 2000.
Controlling This variable is a dummy variable that represents the controlling shareholder's identity: family corpo-
Shareholder's Identity ration, financial instiution, the state, a foreign state, or other (La Ports et al. 2002).
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The table reports means and medians of key variables by insider trading regime.
Countries with a value of ITL*Enforced that is greater than the median of two
are classified as High ITL regimes, while those with a value of ITL*Enforced that
is less than or equal to two are classified as Low ITL regimes. N is the total
number offirms observed for each country; ITL is the index of insider trading law;
Enforced equals I if the country's insider trading law was enforced at least once
before 1994, and 0 otherwise; Tobin's Q is Tobin's Qfrom La Porta et al. (2002);
Cash Flow Ownership is the fraction of common equity owned by the controlling
shareholder from La Porta et al. (2002); and Sales Growth is the growth of sales,
expressed in percentage terms, from La Porta et al. (2002).
All variables are described in detail in Table 2.
Means and Medians by Insider Trading Regime
N ITL IEnforced QITL Tobin's Cash Flow Sales
All Countries 537
Mean 3.22 0.55 1.84 1.56 0.29 0. 15
Median 3.00 1.00 2.00 1.30 0.24 0.12
Low ITL Regimes
Australia 20
Mean 4.00 0.00 0.00 1.41 0.25 0.15
Median 4.00 0.00 0.00 1.37 0.28 0.15
Austria 20
Mean 2.00 0.00 0.00 1.17 0.47 0.13
Median 2.00 0.00 0.00 1.12 0.51 0.09
Denmark 20
Mean 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.92 0.30 0.16
median 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.27 0.11
Germany 20
Mean 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.41 0.30 0.12
Median 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.19 0.27 0.07
Greece 20
Mean 2.00 0.00 0.00 1.98 0.48 0.25
Median 2.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.53 0.22
Ireland 20
Mean 4.00 0.00 0.00 1.31 0.29 0.15
Median 4.00 0.00 0.00 1.29 0.18 0.13
Italy 20
Medan 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.10 0.35 0.13
Median 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.03 0.30 0.07
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Means and Medians by Insider Trading Regime
N JTL Eforced ITL * Tobin 's Cash Flow Sales
Enforced Q Ownership Growth
Japan 20
Mean 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.66 0.25 0.02
Median 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.33 0.16 0.01
Mexico 20
Mean 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 0.36 0.09
Median 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.64 0.34 -0.04
New Zealand 20
Mean 4.00 0.00 0.00 1.53 0.24 0.17
Median 4.00 0.00 0.00 1.33 0.23 0.17
Norway 20
Mean 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.36 0.27 0.16
Median 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.14 0.23 0.14
Portugal 20
Mean 4.00 0.00 0.00 1.20 0.46 0.24
Median 4.00 0.00 0.00 1.09 0.51 0.20
Spain 20
Mean 4.00 0.00 0.00 1.18 0.26 0.09
Median 4.00 0.00 0.00 1.16 0.21 0.05
Switzerland 20
Mean 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.71 0.34 0.15
Median 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.34 0.35 0.11
Low ITL Overall 280
Mean 2.86 0.14 0.21 1.47 0.33 0.14
Median 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.27 0.29 0.10
High ITL Regimes
Argentina 19
Mean 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.25 0.39 0.15
Median 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.15 0.39 0.13
Belgium 20
Mean 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.33 0.29 0.14
Median 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.22 0.29 0.09
Canada 20
Mean 5.00 1.00 5.00 1.97 0.25 0.18
Median 5.00 1.00 5.00 1.75 0.16 0.17
Finland 20
Mean 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.17 0.30 0.16
Median 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.10 0.23 0.15
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Means and Medians by Insider Trading Regime
N ITL Enforced ITL* Tobin's Cash Flow Sales
Enforced Q Ownership Growth
France 20
Mean o4.00 1oo 4.00 1.38 0.02 0.10
Median 4.00 1.00 4.00 1.27 0.18 0.08
Hong Kong 20
Mean 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.49 0.32 0.16
Median 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.16 0.27 0.11
Israel 19
Mean 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.27 0.24 0.16
Median 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.17 0.19 0.13
Netherlands 20
Mean 3.00 j 1.00 3.00 2.06 0.33 0.18
Median 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.74 0.26 0.13
Singapore 20
Mean 4.00 1.00 4.00 1.76 0.31 0.23
Median 4.00 1.00 4.00 1.55 0.29 0.26
South Korea 19
Mean 5.00 1.00 5.00 1.14 0.18 0.19
Median 5.00 1.00 5.00 1.07 0.17 0.21
Sweden 20
Mean 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.45 0.12 j 0.18
Median 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.21 0.07 0.16
United Kingdom 20
Mean 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.15 0.14 0.12
Median 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.72 0.12 0.10
United States 20
Mean 5.00 1.00 5.00 2.98 0.20 0.12
Median 5.00 1.00 5.00 3.08 0.17 0.10
High ITL Overall 257
Mean 3.61 1.00 3.61 1.65 0.26 0.16
Median 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.31 0.19 0.13
Difference of Means
Low ITL vs. High ITL -0.76, -0.86' -3.40, -0.18, 0.07' -0.02'
(t-statistic)
Difference of Medians
Low ITL vs. High ITL 0.34 - 533.00' 0.82 18.30' 6.051
(Chi' statistic)
-The snpusipts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5616, and 100/ lvels, respectively.
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The table reports means and medians of key variables by legal origin, common
law or civil law. N is the total number offirms observed for each legal origin;
ITL is the index of insider trading law; Enforced equals I if the country's
insider trading law was enforced at least once before 1994, and 0 otherwise;
Tobin's Q is Tobin's Q from La Porta et al. (2002); Cash Flow Ownership is the
fraction of common equity owned by the controlling shareholder from La Porta
et al. (2002); and Sales Growth is the growth of sales, expressed in percentage
terms, from La Porta et al. (2002). All variables are described in detail in Table 2.
Means by Legal Origin
N ITL Enforced ITL * Tobin's Cash Flow Sales
Enforced Q Ownership Growth
Common Law 179 2.88 0.50 1.49 1.45 0.25 0.14
Civil Law 358 1.77 0.25 2.55 1.77 0.32 0.16
Difference of Means
Civil Law vs. Common Law -1.01' -0.17, -1.07" 1.56' 0.07' -0.02
(t-statistic)
w The suecpts a, b, and c denote saistical significance at the 1%, 5%. and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 4
This table presents pairwise correlation coefficients for Tobin's Q, the insider
trading law and enforcement measures (ITL, Enforced, and ITL*Enforced),
Cash Flow Ownership and Sales Growth. All variables are described in detail in
Table 2. The numbers in parentheses are the probability levels (p-values) at which
the null hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected in two-tailed tests.
Correlation Matrix
ITL Enforced JTL* Tobin 's Cash Flow Sales
Enforced Q Ownership Growth
ITL 1.00
Enforced 0.12- (0.01) 1.00
JTL*Enforced 0.45' (0.00) 0.90 (0.00) 1.00
Tobin'sQ 0 .09 b (0.05) 0.11- (0.01) 0.17' (0.00) 1.00
Cash FlowOwnshp 
-0.15- (0.00) -0.19- (0.00) -0.20- (0.00) 0.04 (0.38) 1.00Ownership
Sales Grwth 0.12' (0.01) 0.02 (0.68) 0.05 (0.28) 0.23' (0.00) 0.06 (0.18) 1.00
0A The spesripts a, b, and c denote Mtistical significance at the 1%, 541s, and 10% levels, respectiwly.
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The table presents random effects regressions for the dependent variable,
Log(] +Tobin's Q), where Tobin's Q is adjusted by industry, as described
in Table 2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
All variables are described in detail in Table 2.
Random Effects Regressions
PANEL A
Dependent Variable: Log(l+Tobin's )
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales Growth 0.69- (0.13) 0.69- (0.14) 0.68' (0.14) 0.68' (0.14)
HI: ITL 0.01 (0.04) 0.00 (0.05)
H2: Cash Flow Ownership 0.15' (0.09) 0.04 (0.31)
H3: Cash Flow Ownership *ITL 0.05' (0.03) 0.04 (0.09)
Constant -0.02 (0.15) -0.04 (0.06) -0.04 (0.05) -0.05 (0.18)
Number of Observations 538 538 538 538
2 25.39 28.46 28.69 28.70
Prob > I 0.00. 0.00- 0.00 0.00.
"z' The supescripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 50, and 10% levels, espectively.
PANEL B
Dependent Variable: Log(l +Tobin 's Q
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales Growth 0.68' (0.14) 0.68' (0.13) 0.68' (0.14) 0.68' (0.14)
Hi: ITL *Enforced 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03)
H2: Cash Flow Ownership 0.15- (0.09) 0.12 (0.13)
H3: Cash Flow Ownership*ITL 0 0 6 b (0.03) 0.02 (0.05)
*Enforced 0.06__(0.03)_0.02_(0.05)
Constant -0.05 (0.06) -0.04 (0.06) -0.03 (0.05) -0.09 (0.08)
Number of Observations 537 537 537 537
26.85 28.34 29.28 30.59
Prob >)e 0.00' 0.00' 0.0O 0.00'
The supeescspts a, b, and c denote stfistical significance at the 1516, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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The table presents random effects regressions for the dependent variable,
Log(] +Tobin's Q), where Tobin's Q is adjusted by industry, as described in
Table 2. CITL is mean-centered ITL, i.e., the difference between the country's
ITL and the world mean of ITL. All variables are described in detail in Table 2.
Random Effects Regressions (Heterogeneity)
Dependent Variable: Log(l+Tobin's Q)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1)Sales Growth 0.69- (0.13) 0.70- (0.13) 0.69' (0.14) 0.69- (0.14)
(2) CITL -0.09 (0.06) -0.09' (0.06)
(3) C ITL *Enforced -0.07 (0.07) -0.08 (0.07)
(4) CITL *Common Law 0.28' (0.11) 0.22- (0.12)
(5) CITL *Enforced*Common Law 0.30' (0.11) 0 .27b (0.11)
(6) Cash Flow Ownership 0.17 (0.11) 0.20' (0.11) 0.17- (0.10) 0.21 b (0.10)
(7) Cash Flow Ownership 0.27 (0.21) -0.41' (0.25) -0.15 (0.18) -0.28 (0.21)
*Common Law 1
(8) Cash Flow Ownership*CITL 0.02 (0.12) 0.03 (0.12)
(9) Cash Flow Ownership*CTL
*Common Law 0.28 (0.25) 0.35 (0.26)
(10) Cash Flow Ownership 0.04 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05)
*Enforced*C.ITL 0.04_0.05 0.04_0.05
(11) Cash Flow Ownership
*Enforced*C ITL *Common Law 0.02 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07)
(12) Common Law 0.13 (0.12) 0.12 (0.10)
(13) Constant -0.10- (0.05) -0. 13b (0.06) -0.08 (0.05) -0.12b (0.06)
Number of Observations 537 537 537 537
i2  41.03 42.19 42.42 43.74
Prob >)e 0.00' 0.00' 0.00' 0.001
"The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1/, 5%. and 10% levels, respectively.
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The table presents random effects regressions for the dependent variable,
Log(] +Tobin's Q), where Tobin's Q is adjusted by industry, as described in
Table 2. CITL is mean-centered ITL, i.e., the difference between the country's
ITL and the world mean of ITL. Industry-Adjusted Sales Growth is the difference
between the firm's sales growth and the world median sales growth among firms in
the same industry. Country-Adjusted Cash Flow Ownership is the difference be-
tween the controlling shareholder's cash flow ownership and mean cash flow own-
ership for allfirms in the country. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
All variables are described in detail in Table 2.
Random Effects Regressions (Robustness)
Dependent Variable: Log(1+Tobin 's 0
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Industry-Adjusted Sales Growth 0.84' (0.14) 0.84a (0.14) 0.83' (0.14) 0.83' (0.14)
(2) CITL -0. 0 9 b (0.04) -0.0 9 b (0.04)
(3) CITL*Enforced -0.06 (0.06) -0.06 (0.06)
(4) C ITL *Common Law 0.22' (0.09) 0 . 1 9 b (0.10)
(5) C ITL *Enforced*Common Law 0 .2 3b (0.10) 0 .2 1b (0.11)
(6) Country-Adjusted
Cash Flow Ownership 0.22b (0.11) 0.22b (0.11) 0 .2 2 b (0.11) 0 2 2 b (0.11)
(7) Country-Adjusted
Cash Flow Ownership -0.37 (0.25) -0.38 (0.25) -0.29 (0.20) -0.30 (0.20)
*Common Law
(8) Country-Adjusted 006 (0.12) 0.06 (0.12)
Cash Flow Ownership*CITL 0.06_0.12 0.06__.12
(9) Country-Adjusted
Cash Flow Ownership*C_ITL 0.19 (0.26) 0.20 (0.26)
*Common Law
(10) Country-Adjusted
Cash Flow Ownership 0.18 (0.18) 0.19 (0.18)
*Enforced*CITL
(11) Country-Adjusted
Cash Flow Ownership 0.08 (0.28) 0.08 (0.28)
*Enforced*C-ITL *Common Law
(12) Common Law 0.06 (0.09) 0.05 (0.08)
(13) Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
(14) Constant 0.00 (0.07) -0.01 (0.07) 0.03 (0.06) 0.01 (0.07)
Number of Observations 520 520 520 520
53.28 53.71 53.12 53.43
Prob > 0.00' 0.00' 0.00' 0.001
' The sTerscpts a, b, and c denote sttistical significance at die 1%, 5., and 10% level respectively.
Table 8
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